EXCLUSIVE REPORT ON AFGHANISTAN - AT 6:30 A.M. ET:  As readers know, Urgent Agenda has an anonymous source who travels to Afghanistan and has extensive knowledge of the conflict there.  Here is our expert's take on the decisions President Obama, who called Afghanistan "the good war," must make:

Obviously, McChrystal's boys feel things are urgent and can't wait while Obama dithers.

The president is in a tough spot of his own making. To balance his rejection of Bush's "blunder" in Iraq and to establish his defense policy bona fides he embraced the "good" war in Afghanistan: clear connection to 9/11, a broad coalition, and relatively low troop levels. But once he actually had to govern he found that things there were much more complex than he and his advisors understood, and in some ways far more difficult than the situation in Iraq.

The president tried to save himself some time by sacking General McKiernan and perhaps hoped that the new team might find some elegant, low-risk way to improve the situation in Afghanistan.  Spokesmen pretend that he is sending new troops, but the troops that are arriving now were requested by McKiernan under the Bush administration.  

McChrystal now sees what was hobbling McKiernan: far too few boots on the ground, a dysfunctional command structure, and (some) unreliable allies.  The "neo-Taliban" is on the rise and Obama must now decide:  Will he "write the check" required to make a serious effort to continue the counterinsurgency efforts?  He has verbally committed to this on several occasions, but now that the day of decision is upon him, he seems to be seeking an easy way out.

Will he abandon the current mission?  This mission is not murky and vague as he asserts, but very clear:  establish a stable central government in Afghanistan that will be capable of governing itself and preventing the use of its territory as a terrorist base.  

It IS a very difficult mission. There may be good reasons to think the mission is too difficult and to seek alternate means of preventing the return of Al-Qaeda, but talk of using air power, special forces and additional Afghan forces to manage the country from afar is pure fantasy.  

There are no easy options, and an abrupt withdrawal has some real dangers:

1.  Afghans who decided to cooperate with NATO, counting on promises of a long-term commitment, will be left exposed and extremely vulnerable. 

2.  Pakistan is left in a particularly awkward situation. Obama administration officials have rightly identified that the insurgency problem as a regional one, pointing to the porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border as a source of sanctuary and resupply for rebels. Recently, prodded by the US, the Pakistani Army has been putting pressure on the Pakistan Taliban, and is having some limited success. But without a strong US presence in Afghanistan, Pakistanis will face an enemy now free to evaporate to the Afghan side of the border, sort of the reverse of the problem that has caused us so much trouble.  A now emboldened Pakistan Taliban may destabilize this nuclear nation.

3.  NATO will suffer a severe blow to its confidence, prestige, and will to execute future missions.  Some of the nations participating enthusiastically in this mission--I am thinking particularly of Poland--have been doing so not so much because of their interests in a stable Afghanistan, but more with an eye toward a confident, successful NATO, which a resurgent Russia must respect and account for. An ignominious withdrawal and the perception of failure will cause a crisis of confidence in Europe.

4. The Taliban will return, though not in as widespread a manner as in the past:  warlords in the north and west of the country will not allow this.  But it is likely to return with a vengeance to the Kabul area, the east and the south, especially around Kandahar, Ghazni and Khowst.  It is not certain that Al-Qaeda will be welcomed back with open arms (real rifts developed between the Afghans and the Arab Al-Qaeda hands), but it is possible.

5. Ironically, Iran will be source of stability in the region that we will have to rely upon (though not openly), undercutting our leverage in attempting to contain its nuclear ambitions.  Iran does not want chaos on its borders, and has strong religious and cultural influence deep into Afghanistan.  

Even if McChrystal gets the troops he is requesting and is somehow able to develop "unity of effort," despite the less than ideal command structure, I am skeptical about our ability to produce long-term stability in Afghanistan.  We may have to be satisfied with Afghanistan devolving into a collection of fiefdoms, governed by strongmen whom we quietly support in their efforts to fend off the Taliban.  But getting from here to there will be ugly and embarrassing for the West, and will severely reduce our will to act decisively in support of our interests.

The good war was a mirage:  the coalition that lent legitimacy has hampered operations, and the low level of troops has prevented any serious attempts at counterinsurgency.  

As for the ties to 9/11...well, who thinks about that anymore?  That was just a crime spree, to the new administration's way of thinking.

Well stated, by a real authority.

September 23,  2009